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FINDINGS OF FACT VS. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
HOW THE LAW COURT COMPLICATED THE CASE
OF STATE V. CONNOR
Christopher S. Boulos*
I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Connor,1 the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law
Court, upheld a trial judge’s2 denial of a motion to suppress evidence.3 Although
the evidence presented in the suppression hearing seemed adequate to support the
denial of the motion, the trial judge failed to clearly state his conclusions of law
when denying the motion. However, the Law Court mistook the ambiguous
conclusions of law as ambiguous findings of fact. Because the findings of fact
were ambiguous in the court’s view, the majority and dissenting opinions4 spent the
bulk of their energies discussing how the court should review a case when the
findings of fact are ambiguous. However, as this Note will discuss, the Law Court
essentially turned a straightforward case into a convoluted one by delving into the
findings of fact “issue” in such detail.
In essence, the findings of fact issue should not have been addressed at all.
The Law Court simply mistreated an ambiguity in the trial judge’s legal conclusion
as an ambiguity in its factual conclusion. Since the court reviews legal conclusions
de novo,5 an ambiguous legal conclusion by a trial judge should not matter since
the court will revisit the issue in full on appeal. Accordingly, the court should have
simply undertaken a de novo review of the law applied to the facts in the case.
However, because it mistook a legal conclusion for a factual one, the court spent
considerable time discussing how to review a case when a historical fact is not
clear from the findings of fact—a situation this Note will call the “Hypo.”6 Along
with examining the facts and opinions of the Connor case, and explaining how the
court should have dealt with the case, this Note will also address the Hypo, and
how the court should address an ambiguity in the findings of fact.
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Maine School of Law; B.A., 2007, Columbia University. I
would like to thank Professor Melvyn Zarr for all of his insight and help on this Note. I would also like
to thank my family for the tremendous amount of support they have given me throughout law school
and life—without them, this would not have been possible. Finally, thank you to the editors and staff of
the Maine Law Review for your excellent editing and hard work.
1. 2009 ME 91, 977 A.2d 1003.
2. The trial judge was Judge Kevin M. Cuddy, sitting in Hancock County.
3. Connor, 2009 ME 91, ¶ 12, 977 A.2d at 1006.
4. Connor was decided by a 3-2 majority. Justice Alexander wrote for the majority, including
Chief Justice Saufley and Justice Mead. Justice Clifford filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice
Levy joined.
5. “Accordingly, a motion court’s findings of historical fact will be overturned only when clearly
erroneous; however, the legal conclusions drawn from the historical facts are subject to an independent
examination by this court.” State v. Sylvain, 2003 ME 5, ¶ 10, 814 A.2d 984, 987 (citations omitted).
6. “The Hypo” refers to the hypothetical situation where a fact in the findings is actually in
dispute. Although the court treats Connor as this type of case, it is not. In Connor, the historical facts
of the case are largely undisputed—it is only the judge’s legal conclusion that is unclear.
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II. THE CONNOR CASE
A. Factual Background
Connor’s appeal stemmed from a motion to suppress evidence7 obtained by the
Hancock County Sheriff’s Department during an investigation of an underage
drinking party in Penobscot on October 29, 2007.8 The Sheriff’s Department9 had
decided to patrol an area that had a reputation for loud parties where underage
drinking often occurred.10 While on their detail, the deputies came across “what
appeared to be a good-size party” based on “the music, [the] people outside, and
that sort.”11
The deputies parked in a location so that the party-goers could not see them
and then walked towards the suspected party building in a sort of “roundabout”
fashion.12 As the deputies were walking, they observed a pick-up truck backing
down the road for ten to fifteen yards and subsequently into a ditch.13 The truck
attempted to move forward, spun its tires, was able to return to the road, and then
paused.14 At that point, a deputy approached the driver’s side door and produced
his law enforcement identification to the defendant in the case—Sean T. Connor—
and presumably proceeded to treat Connor like any other traffic stop suspect.15
Connor was subsequently charged with operating under the influence.16

7. Evidence suppression in Maine criminal cases is mandated from the 1961 landmark United
States Supreme Court case of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). When reviewing a trial court’s
findings of fact from a suppression hearing, the Law Court has always used the clear error standard—
that is, a suppression order will only be overturned if there is no competent evidence in the record to
support the trial judge’s findings of fact. See, e.g., State v. MacKenzie, 161 Me. 123, 134, 210 A.2d 24,
31 (1965) (“A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.”).
8. Transcript of Record at 11, State v. Connor, 2009 ME 91, 977 A.2d 1003 (No. HAN-08-524). It
is unclear from the record when Connor was actually stopped. The sheriff’s deputy testified that he was
working the night of October 29; however, the summons was issued on October 30. Id. at 1, 11.
9. The sheriff’s deputy testifying at the suppression hearing could not remember the exact number
of deputies involved, but “believe[d] it was three or four, roughly.” Id. at 12.
10. Id. at 11-12.
11. Id. at 12.
12. Id. at 13.
13. Transcript of Record, supra note 8, at 15.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 26. The record is unclear on how the stop proceeded after the deputy approached the
truck. Presumably, the deputy obtained evidence of Connor’s intoxication, which was what he sought to
have suppressed. However, it is important to note that none of these historical facts were ever in dispute.
The sheriff’s deputy was the only witness to testify at the suppression hearing, and the transcript does
not indicate that Connor’s attorney seriously disputed any of these facts.
16. The statute reads in relevant part: “A person commits OUI if that person: A. Operates a motor
vehicle: (1) While under the influence of intoxicants; or (2) While having a blood-alcohol level of
0.08% or more.” ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 2411 (Supp. 2009-2010). Ironically, Connor was not
younger than twenty-one at the time of the stop and could not be charged with underage drinking, which
was the purpose of the investigation.
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Connor then moved to have the evidence obtained from the stop suppressed;17
however, the trial judge denied this motion after finding that the officer had
reasonable articulable suspicion18 of impaired driving to stop the vehicle. More
specifically, the judge said, “[I think] under those circumstances19 [it] would be
reasonable suspicion to stop every vehicle leaving that party to determine whether
the person was underage and whether they had been drinking. I think it’s a close
question, but I think in these circumstances there was an articulable position and I
think it was reasonable.”20 After the judge made this determination, he permitted
Connor’s attorney to inquire about the findings.21 Connor’s attorney specifically
tried to clarify the judge’s conclusion by asking, “[Is] the finding that it’s
reasonable because it would have been reasonable to stop any vehicle leaving the
party on those facts?”22 The judge answered, “I think under those circumstances of
this particular case where it appears to have been coming right from the location
that party, that it would have been, yes.”23 Connor’s attorney made no further
inquests. Because the motion was denied, Connor subsequently entered a
conditional plea24 and preserved his right to appeal the judge’s denial of his motion
to suppress.25
B. The Law Court Opinions
The opinion of the Law Court, delivered by Justice Alexander, concluded that
the trial court did not err in finding that the sheriff’s deputy had reasonable
articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle. The opinion spent equal time addressing
the ambiguity of the “findings of fact” and the actual application of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence to those facts.26 Justice Alexander started by reviewing
the suppression hearing transcript for the findings of fact. In the majority’s view,
the factual record was “ambiguous” because neither the trial judge, nor Connor’s
attorney, ever clarified if the “circumstances of this particular case” referred only to
a truck leaving a party where underage drinking was occurring, or if it also

17. The record is unclear as to what evidence Connor was trying to have suppressed. Presumably it
would have included a blood-alcohol result or breathalyzer test and possibly any statements he may
have made to the sheriff’s deputy.
18. The legality of traffic stops is based on the “reasonable articulable suspicion” standard. State v.
Porter, 2008 ME 175, ¶ 11 960 A.2d 321, 323. The court has defined this standard as an officer’s
suspicion that is “more than mere speculation or an unsubstantiated hunch.” Id.
19. “Those circumstances” include the fact the sheriff’s deputies were at the party to specifically
investigate underage drinking, there seemed to be a party going on, and they had a “vehicle leaving the
party.” Transcript of Record, supra note 8, at 33-34.
20. Id. at 34.
21. Although not specifically indicated by the transcript, this request was made pursuant to ME. R.
CRIM. P. 41(A)(d).
22. Transcript of Record, supra note 8, at 34.
23. Id.
24. ME. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2).
25. Connor, 2009 ME 91, ¶ 6, 977 A.2d at 1005.
26. This Note will assume that had the findings of fact been as the majority interpreted them, the
sheriff’s deputy would have had reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct the search. Even the dissent
concedes this—”there was more than sufficient evidence . . . that would support the denial of [the]
motion to suppress.” Id., ¶ 13, 977 A.2d at 1006 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
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included the fact that the truck backed into a ditch.27
Thus, as the court wrote, when the findings are “ambiguous,” Rule 41(A)(d) of
the Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure28 “invites parties to seek clarification of the
court’s findings on any issue by filing a motion for further findings and
conclusions” because the “findings, stated orally at the conclusion of a contested
hearing, may not always address with precision each issue that a party, with the
clarity of hindsight, may deem important.”29 Consequently, Justice Alexander
found that Connor’s attorney did not adequately seek clarification or further
findings of fact, despite the fact that his attorney asked several follow-up questions
after the judge made his ruling.30
The dissenters, on the other hand, did not see the ambiguity in the factual
record that the majority illustrated. Although Justice Clifford agreed that “there
was more than sufficient evidence presented by the State that would support the
denial of Connor’s motion to suppress the evidence of his intoxication,” he
nonetheless would have vacated the judgment because the “findings recited by the
court . . . do not provide a sufficient basis to justify the stop.”31 To the dissenters, it
appeared that Connor’s attorney had made a specific request for the court to clarify
its findings, and the court “made clear that it was relying on the fact that the truck
was driving away from a party where underage drinking was suspected.”32
Similarly, the court “made no mention of Connor’s operation of the vehicle, and
did not indicate that it was placing any reliance on the operation of the vehicle as
contributing to the justification for the stop.”33 To Justice Clifford, the “findings of
fact” unambiguously referenced only the truck leaving a party where underage
drinking was suspected and not its operation. This alone, in the dissenter’s view,
was insufficient to satisfy the reasonable articulable suspicion standard, and thus
the evidence should have been suppressed.34
27. Id., ¶ 7, 977 A.2d at 1005. As noted supra note 5, this ambiguity is not over a historical fact,
i.e., whether or not Connor’s truck actually backed into a ditch, but rather over the trial judge’s legal
reasoning as to what constituted the reasonable articulable suspicion needed to justify the stop.
28. Rule 41(A)(d) provides:
If the motion [to suppress] is granted, the court shall enter an order limiting the
admissibility of the evidence according to law. If the motion is granted or denied, the
court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law either on the record or in writing.
If the court fails to make such findings and conclusions, a party may file a motion
seeking compliance with the requirement. If the motion is granted and if the findings and
conclusions are in writing, the clerk shall mail a date-stamped copy thereof to each
counsel of record and note the mailing on the criminal docket. If the findings and
conclusions are oral, the clerk shall mail a copy of the docket sheet containing the
relevant docket entry and note the mailing on the criminal docket.
ME. R. CRIM. P. 41(A)(d).
29. Connor, 2009 ME 91, ¶ 8, 977 A.2d at 1005.
30. Id., ¶ 7, 799 A.2d at 1005.
31. Id., ¶ 13, 977 A.2d at 1006 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
32. Id., ¶ 17, 977 A.2d 1003 at 1007.
33. Id.
34. Justice Clifford compares Connor’s stop to a situation where a person is operating a vehicle near
a bar late at night: “ [W]here a person is seen leaving a bar, or driving late at night around the time when
the bars generally close, a person driving a vehicle from a party where underage drinking is suspected,
by itself, does not amount to reasonable articulable suspicion that would justify an investigatory stop.”
Id., ¶ 19, 977 A.2d at 1008.
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Unlike Justice Alexander’s majority opinion, which split equal time between
discussing the adequacy of the findings of fact and the application of the Fourth
Amendment, the dissenting opinion is almost entirely spent on the findings of fact
issue. In his discussion of the findings of fact, Justice Clifford emphasized the
effort that Connor’s attorney engaged in to clarify the record: “Connor stated that
he was making the request so that ‘[it] may be clear for the record.’”35 To the
dissenters, this request to make the record clear “fulfilled [Connor’s] obligation
pursuant to Rule 41(A)(d) to request the court to expand on inadequate findings in
order for the record to be meaningful for appellate review.”36 Consequently,
“Connor’s attorney made a good faith request for further findings to determine on
what facts the court was relying when it considered whether the stop was
justified.”37
C. Where the Law Court Went Wrong: Findings of Fact vs. Conclusions of Law
As is evidenced from Part II(B) discussed above, both the majority and
dissenting opinions spent a significant amount of time addressing the adequacy of
the trial judge’s findings of fact and whether Connor’s attorney had fulfilled his
Rule 41(A)(d) obligations. However, in all reality, the Connor case did not warrant
such a discussion. Why? Because whether the officers had “reasonable articulable
suspicion” is a question of law38 and should be reviewed de novo by the Law Court.
Since the historical facts of the case were undisputed, the only conclusion left for
the trial judge to make would be a legal conclusion.
In this case, the trial judge had to weigh whether the operation of the truck, the
backing into the ditch, and the suspected drinking constituted reasonable articulable
suspicion. Although the judge may have been ambiguous about which of these
“circumstances” he used to reach the reasonable articulable suspicion conclusion,
he was still applying the law to undisputed facts. In essence, it didn’t really matter
which “circumstances” or factual findings the judge used to reach the reasonable
articulable suspicion standard, because, on appeal, the Law Court should make its
own determination about whether or not the evidence presented at trial constituted
reasonable articulable suspicion.
As both the majority and dissenting opinions make clear, there was more than
adequate evidence in the record to support a legal conclusion of reasonable
articulable suspicion. Justice Alexander writes:
35. Connor, 2009 ME 91, ¶ 15, 977 A.2d at 1006.
36. Id., ¶ 16, 977 A.2d at 1007.
37. Id., ¶ 17, 977 A.2d at 1007.
38. In Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996), the United States Supreme Court affirmatively
set forth that the reasonable articulable suspicion standard requires de novo review. The Court wrote:
We think independent appellate review of these ultimate determinations of reasonable
suspicion and probable cause is consistent with the position we have taken in past cases.
We have never, when reviewing a probable-cause or reasonable-suspicion determination
ourselves, expressly deferred to the trial court’s determination. . . . This, if a matter-ofcourse, would be unacceptable. In addition, the legal rules for probable cause and
reasonable suspicion acquire content only through application. Independent review is
therefore necessary if appellate courts are to maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal
principles. Finally, de novo review tends to unify precedent.
Id. at 697-98 (citations omitted).
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Here, the officer was investigating in the vicinity of a large, loud party where
drinking of alcoholic beverages was likely occurring. He saw a truck back down a
lane and then, on a straight section of the lane, veer off the lane and back into a
ditch. He then saw the truck spin its wheels to get out of the ditch and stop in the
39
middle of the lane.

To the majority, all of these undisputed facts easily supported a belief of reasonable
articulable suspicion that the operator might be impaired or ill, or that there might
be a problem with the vehicle.40 Similarly, the dissent writes, “I do not disagree
that there was more than sufficient evidence presented by the state that would
support [the motion].”41 Thus, if the court had strictly undertaken a de novo review
of the reasonable articulable suspicion, the opinion would have been unanimous, as
all agreed there was enough factual evidence presented to support a legal finding of
reasonable articulable suspicion. The court, however, failed to distinguish between
law and fact42 and ultimately wasted time discussing an irrelevant legal ambiguity
in the trial court’s findings, leading to a dissent on an irrelevant issue.
III. THE CONNOR HYPO
Although there was no factual ambiguity in the record in Connor, the Law
Court spent significant time discussing one. This presents an interesting
question—what should the court do when there really is an ambiguity in the
findings of fact?—a situation this Note will refer to as the “Hypo.” More
specifically, the Hypo will include all of the same facts as the Connor case, except
it will assume that Connor himself took the stand to say that he never backed into a
ditch. This would create a situation where there actually would be a factual
dispute. Because of this, the trial judge’s findings of fact would have been
important. In this Hypo, it is easy to see how the ambiguity in the record—that is,
which witness the trial judge credited regarding the backing into the ditch—could
have a significant impact on the court’s application of the Fourth Amendment.43
Assuming this Hypo did reach the court, the real question becomes how the court
should treat the ambiguity in the findings of fact. In this situation, the analysis the
court provided in Connor actually becomes relevant. This part of the Note will
39. Connor, 2009 ME 91, ¶ 11, 977 A.2d at 1006.
40. Id.
41. Id., ¶ 13, 977 A.2d at 1006 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
42. Just six years ago in State v. Sylvain, the Law Court recognized this important distinction and
illustrated the proper method of appellate review. First, the court wrote that the motion judge decides
historical facts, which are not disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. 2003 ME 5, ¶ 8,
814 A.2d 984, 987. Second, the motion judge must use these historical facts in reaching legal
conclusions. Id., ¶ 9, 814 A.2d at 987. The Law Court stated that a “challenge to the application of
constitutional protections to historical facts is a matter of law that we review de novo. We are in the
same position as the motion court to determine whether an application of the governing constitutional
principles to the historical facts warrants a particular legal conclusion.” Id. In Connor, the court
obviously failed to make this important distinction.
43. For example, if Connor’s truck did not back into the ditch, it would be a much closer call on the
reasonableness of the deputy’s suspicion. The dissenters would probably find this situation analogous to
a “person operat[ing] a vehicle outside of or near a bar, or late at night around the time that bars
generally close.” Connor, 2009 ME 91, ¶ 18, 977 A.2d at 1007. Thus, if the trial judge believed
Connor’s testimony, the validity of the stop would have been a much closer question.
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examine how the court has dealt with ambiguities in the past, and apply the
reasoning from the Connor case to the Hypo to see how the court would likely
address an ambiguity today.
In the past, the Law Court has reviewed a motion to suppress with ambiguous
findings of fact in two drastically different ways. The first approach, which is
devastating to the appellant, is to simply dismiss the appeal for not providing an
accurate record. As the court noted, when utilizing this “harsh” approach:
[The appeallant] must meet its obligation as an appellant to provide us with a
sufficient record that includes adequate findings of fact, or at least must take all
procedural steps within its power to do so . . . . [B]ecause the [appellant] has failed
44
to provide such record here, its appeal must fail.

The obvious effect of this approach is to punish the appellant for not requesting
additional findings of fact, even though the trial judge also had an obligation to
provide them.45
The second approach that the Law Court has utilized more recently is the
“inferential” standard—that is, the court is willing to infer that the trial judge found
all facts in favor of the winning party. The court has articulated this standard as
follows:
Absent a specific finding or request therefore, the trial court is presumed to have
made all factual findings necessary to support its decision. Since a finding that the
stop was based upon “reasonable and articulable suspicion” was necessary to the
court’s decision not to suppress the evidence, we must assume that it made such a
46
finding.

Because the Law Court spent so much time addressing the findings of fact
issue in Connor, even though it was irrelevant, one can make an educated guess as
to how the court would handle the Hypo. As he indicated in Connor, Justice
Alexander would have used an “inferential” standard of review. This standard
allows the Law Court to respect the trial court’s judgment “if those inferred
findings are supportable by evidence in the record.”47 In the Hypo, then, Justice
Alexander would still find in favor of the State because there was some evidence in
the record of the truck backing into the ditch (e.g., the officer’s testimony). As part
of this standard, the majority essentially would interpret an ambiguity in the record
in favor of the winning party in the trial court.
The dissenters seem to take a different approach. Justice Clifford argued that
the trial court had “made no mention of Connor’s operation of the vehicle, and did
not indicate that it was placing any reliance on the operation of the vehicle as
contributing to the justification for the stop. The court was not required to accept
all of the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.”48 This would seem to
indicate that if indeed the record were ambiguous as to a factual point, the
44. State v. Kneeland, 552 A.2d 4, 6 (Me. 1988).
45. Rule 41(A)(d) mandates that the judge provide findings of fact. If either party is not satisfied
with the judge’s findings, it is permitted to request further findings. ME. R. CRIM. P. 41(A)(d).
46. State v. D’Angelo, 605 A.2d 68, 70 (Me. 1992). See also State v. Powell, 591 A.2d 1306 (Me.
1991).
47. Connor, 2009 ME 91, ¶ 9, 977 A.2d at 1005.
48. Id., ¶ 17, 977 A.2d at 1007 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
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dissenters would not infer anything. Rather, they would solely rely on facts
explicitly found by the court. If this approach were applied to the Hypo, the end
result would likely be much different. More specifically, the ambiguity in the
Hypo record—that is if the truck actually went into the ditch—would be resolved
in favor of Connor simply because it was not addressed at all by the trial court.
This approach seems fairly radical and a departure from the court’s jurisprudence.
Lastly, if the Law Court had applied the “harsh” approach mentioned above—
that is, to simply dismiss appeals with ambiguous records—the result would be
obvious. Since Connor would be the appealing party, it would be his responsibility
to request adequate findings of fact pursuant to Rule 41(A)(d) and provide them to
the court for review. Since the record would be inadequate, the court would uphold
the trial judge’s determination without ever reaching the merits. Again, this
approach seems harsh as it places an extreme burden on the appealing party to
make sure the record is free from factual ambiguities.
IV. THE “INFERENTIAL” STANDARD AND ITS EFFECT ON TRIAL JUDGES, THE LAW
COURT, AND DEFENDANTS
Applying these three approaches to the Hypo illustrates the radically different
ways the Law Court could treat a case with an actual ambiguous factual record. As
noted, the court has used the “harsh” and “inferential” approaches before, but has
never used the approach illustrated by the dissent.49 Surely, all of the justices
would agree that they want to review motions to suppress with a deferential
standard—that is, they only want to overturn a trial court’s factual determinations if
they are clearly erroneous.50 This has sound policy implications. Trial judges are
best able to judge the weight and credibility of witness testimony, examine physical
evidence, and review exhibits presented by attorneys. However, as the Connor
case shows, the two opinions take drastically different positions on how to review a
motion to suppress when the factual record is less than perfect. In the dissenting
opinion, Justice Clifford believes that the “inferential” standard used by the
majority will have negative effects on trial judges, attorneys, and defendants.51
This part of the Note will examine if the “inferential” standard the majority opinion
articulates actually does affect any constituents of the legal system as Justice
Clifford feared.
A. Trial Judges
It is debatable how an “inferential” standard of review affects trial judges. At
49. After a diligent search, the Author could not find any examples where the court has used this
approach in a suppression hearing context.
50. The majority maintained that the Law Court “will not substitute [its] judgment as to the weight
or credibility of the evidence for that of the fact-finder if there is evidence in the record to rationally
support the trial court’s result. The trial court’s findings in this case must be judged by this deferential
standard of review.” Connor, 2009 ME 91, ¶ 9, 977 A.2d at 1005. On the other hand, the dissent argued
that the Law Court’s “review of the [trial] court’s ultimate determination . . . should . . . be based solely
on the facts found by the court, if supported by competent evidence in the record.” Id., ¶ 17, 977 A.2d at
1007 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
51. Justice Clifford believes requests for further findings will increase the burden on attorneys and
courts, and will result in higher attorneys fees. Id., n.5, 977 A.2d at 1007 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
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first glance, this standard appears to lighten the workload for trial judges. That is,
if the Law Court is willing to infer all findings of fact in favor of the trial court’s
opinion, the trial judge will not have to expound or go through pains to make the
record clear. However, the dissent seems to think the “inferential” standard will
only make this duty more onerous. As Justice Clifford noted:
It is the nature of suppression motion practice that facts are often found . . . from
the bench, and that requests for further findings . . . are also made orally and
decided from the bench. To require parties to always file a written motion for
further findings following the hearing . . . will impose an unnecessary burden . . .
52
on the courts.

Former Justice Hornby (now, ironically, a federal trial judge) also voiced this
concern: “I believe it is unrealistic to expect . . . District Court judges, confronting
the volume of cases they do without adequate secretarial assistance, to provide the
detail we might prefer [in the findings of fact].”53 In essence, the only way an
appellant could avoid the “inferential” standard would be to require trial judges to
be painstakingly unambiguous in their findings. This could result in longer
hearings, more written motions, and essentially change the informal “nature of
suppression motion practice.”54 On the other hand, if the appealing party does not
request further findings of fact, a trial judge’s workload will be significantly
reduced.
B. The Law Court
To the Law Court, the inferential standard mentioned in this case is nothing
new. It typically uses this standard in reviewing trial court verdicts. Because it is
often impossible to determine what facts and witnesses juries credited during their
deliberations, the court will generally infer that they found all facts necessary to
convict if those inferred findings are supported by the evidence. In essence, this
makes the court’s job easier because the Law Court can defer to trial courts and
does not have to make factual determinations. However, the argument for using an
inferential standard is seriously weakened in a suppression motion context, as trial
judges are not only completely able but are also compelled to enter findings of fact
adequate for review.55 Furthermore, even though motions to suppress are generally
fact intensive, the applicable Fourth Amendment law still needs to be applied
correctly to those facts.56 Hence, a clear record would actually make the
application of the law easier for the court.
C. Defendants
Lastly, the defendants themselves are affected by this “inferential” standard.
More motions for further findings will mean more time for scheduling, deciding,
52. Id.
53. Kneeland, 552 A.2d at 8 (Hornby, J., dissenting).
54. Connor, 2009 ME 91, n. 5, 977 A.2d at 1007 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
55. ME. R. CRIM. P. 41(A)(d).
56. This is illustrated by the Hypo. If it were unclear whether Connor backed into the ditch, the
court would have had a difficult time applying the Fourth Amendment to the case.
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and writing opinions—all of which will result in longer delays for the defendant
and higher attorney’s fees. Most importantly, if a suppression motion is wrongly
decided by the trial court, and the Law Court does not insist on a clear record, then
there exists a real possibility that the error in the trial court will not be corrected on
appeal. Without the ability to correct trial court mistakes, the Law Court
essentially loses all value to defendants.
V. HOW THE COURT SHOULD ADDRESS A REAL
AMBIGUITY IN THE FINDINGS OF FACT
With these competing considerations, it is hard to imagine a way to review an
ambiguous record that would not have negative consequences for some and
positive outcomes for others. Also, any change in criminal practice—where liberty
is at stake—should carefully balance the due process rights of the accused with the
need for an effective and expeditious judicial system. While keeping these
important values in the background, this part of the Note will propose a change in
how the Law Court should review ambiguous factual records from suppression
hearings and articulate the reasons for that change. More specifically, the Law
Court should abandon the “inferential” guessing game57 it currently plays and
replace it with a structure under which appeals with inadequate records are simply
not entertained, except in cases where the appealing party made a good-faith effort
to provide adequate findings of fact. In the case where the appealing party makes
the effort to clarify and expand an ambiguous record, yet the trial judge’s findings
of fact are still incomplete or ambiguous, the Law Court should remand the case for
further findings of fact.
A. Step One: Turn Away Appeals with Inadequate Records
In almost all contexts of appellate review, the appealing party bears the burden
of providing a clear record for the appellate court to review. The Law Court has
made it clear that this general rule applies to criminal and civil cases alike:
An appellant has the burden of supplying this Court with a record adequate to
permit a fair consideration of the issues presented for review. When the record
made available to the Law Court to support an appeal is inadequate, such appeal
58
must fail, and this applies in criminal appeals as it does on the civil side.

For reasons that are not entirely clear, the court has relaxed this rule over the years
and has “inferred” findings of fact when the record has been unclear, as discussed
above.59 However, re-establishing this bright line (albeit harsh) rule will ultimately
benefit the Law Court in conducting its review of suppression motions.

57. This is referred to as a “game” because the Law Court does not know how the trial court
decided the issue. Instead, it just assumes or guesses that it found in favor of the winning party.
58. State v. Thwing, 487 A.2d 260, 262 (Me. 1985). See also State v. Kerr, 455 A.2d 425, 425 (Me.
1982); State v. MacArthur, 417 A.2d 976, 979 (Me. 1980); State v. Howard, 405 A.2d 206, 208 (Me.
1979).
59. In Kneeland, the Law Court rejected an appeal from a suppression motion because the findings
of fact presented to it were insufficient. It did not “infer” anything from the trial judge’s ruling.
Kneeland, 552 A.2d at 6.
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At first glance, this strict structure appears to impose additional burdens on
attorneys, and consequently, on trial judges. An attorney who is faced with the
threat of having an appeal denied for an inadequate record will be sure to clarify
the record to the best of her ability. This may result in additional questions and the
occasional written motion, which in turn, produces work for the trial judge.
However, as Justice Clifford pointed out in his dissent, these are generally informal
hearings where most of the questions and answers are oral. It is hard to imagine
how a few clarifying questions could impose a truly arduous burden on either the
attorney or the trial judge. Furthermore, as zealous advocates for a defendant with
his or her liberty on the line, an attorney should be encouraged to ask questions and
clarify the record—after all, part of what the attorney’s job. Lastly, because
attorneys practice in a field where a definitive answer is rarely certain, it seems that
an attorney would appreciate a bright-line standard over an unclear one.
Of course, the Law Court is the real beneficiary of this change. The court is
able to keep its deferential standard of review (clear error), can easily dispose of
appeals without adequate records (instead of trying to “infer” what the trial judge
found), and will ultimately receive more thorough findings of fact from the trial
courts to review. This will also result in a more accurate application of the law to
the specific facts of each case, which is one of the primary functions of an appellate
court.
B. Provide a “Good-Faith” Exception and Allow for
Remand if the Record Is Inadequate or Ambiguous
This hard-line approach would seem to leave some appellants out in the cold.
For example, if this approach had been used in the Hypo, then Connor’s appeal
would not have been heard at all. However, the Law Court should allow for a
“good-faith” exception—that is, when the appealing attorney made an honest and
good-faith attempt to clarify an ambiguity in the record or expound the trial court’s
recited findings, the Law Court should remand the case to the trial court for clearer
and fuller findings of fact. Once the clarified findings are completed, the Law
Court could hear the case with a clear record—eliminating the need for the
“inferential” guessing game that is currently utilized.
This approach is hardly radical—it has been utilized by the Law Court in other
contexts60 and by courts in other states in the suppression context.61 The use of

60. See, e.g., Chapel Rd. Assocs. v. Town of Wells, 2001 ME 178, ¶ 1, 787 A.2d 137, 138
(concluding “that the Board’s findings of fact are insufficient to permit appellate review, we vacate the
Superior Court’s judgment with instructions to remand the matter to the Board for findings of fact.”).
61. See, e.g., Arizona v. Zamora, 202 P.3d 528 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (remanding because the record
was insufficient for the appellate court to determine whether defendant’s statement should be
suppressed); Johnson v. Wyoming, 214 P.3d 983 (Wyo. 2009) (holding that the record on appeal was
insufficient to allow for appellate review, and thus remand was required for factual findings and
conclusions of law in a suppression hearing); Oregon v. Lantzsch, 214 P.3d 22, (Or. Ct. App. 2009)
(holding trial court’s failure to make finding of fact regarding whether defendant subjectively believed
that he had been seized required remand); Skjervem v. Alaska, 215 P.3d 1101 (Alaska 2009) (remanding
a case to the trial court for further findings of fact on a suppression hearing); Tennessee v. Gentry, No.
02C01-9708-CC-00335, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. 1998 WL 351228, at *2 (July 2, 1998) (holding that the
trial court “failed to perform its affirmative duty and state the essential findings on the record,” and as a
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remand for further findings of fact by an appellate court serves an important
function: by remanding cases with incomplete factual records, the Law Court will
ensure that it has an adequate record to review if the case subsequently returns for
review and can apply the appropriate law to an accurate reading of the facts.
However, by limiting the remand option to the rare cases where the appealing party
made a good-faith effort to provide an accurate and unambiguous record, the Law
Court will ensure that the amount of extra work for trial judges and attorneys is
limited. Thus, it seems that remanding only in these limited circumstances would
not have much strain on any of the competing constituencies mentioned above.
Had this method been used in the Hypo, it is likely that the case would have
been remanded for further (and clearer) findings of fact.62 Since the findings would
be viewed as ambiguous, the case should have been turned down unless Connor
could show he made a good-faith effort at clarifying the record. As the dissent
points out, Connor’s attorney did make such an effort, so under this proposed
change, the Hypo would have been remanded to the trial court to answer a single
question—if Connor actually backed into the ditch or not. This would result in a
better application of the law by the Law Court, and the extra work required of the
trial court and attorneys would have been minimal. Meanwhile, the defendant
would have had his case more accurately reviewed for legal error. This ultimately
benefits the Law Court and the defendants, while not drastically harming the trial
court.
VI. CONCLUSION
This proposed change is not the only way the Law Court could deal with this
issue. The court could choose to amend Rule 41(A)(d) to further mandate
unambiguous findings of fact.63 However, given that the rule already makes
findings of fact mandatory64 for the trial judge, it is unlikely that such a change
would have any real effect. The court could also consider remanding any case in
which the findings of fact are ambiguous—however, this would likely result in the
remanding of many cases, and consequently, an increased workload for busy trial
judges. On the other hand, the court could use the “inferential” standard mentioned
by the majority in Connor. However, as the Hypo illustrates, this could cause the
court to infer something that was never actually found by the trial judge.
Eventually, if this standard is used, the court will get it wrong and infer something
incorrectly, resulting in the punishment of an innocent person. Thus, it seems the
change that this Note proposes is an effective way to better serve the Law Court,
criminal defendants, and trial judges. The bright-line nature of the rule will make it
easy for attorneys and trial judges to follow, and make sure that they live up to their
Rule 41(A)(d) obligations to request further findings of fact. More accurate
findings of fact will result in more meaningful appellate review, which benefits
result, on remand, the trial judge would be required to “state on the record the factual findings that
support his legal conclusions.”).
62. This assumes that Connor’s attorney in the Hypo had requested a clarification on the ditch issue,
yet the trial judge still did not provide a clear answer.
63. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 9 (2003).
64. ME. R. CRIM. P. 41(A)(d) advisory committee note to 1986 Amendment.
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both the Law Court and the accused. Although in Connor the court only needed to
review an ambiguous legal conclusion, this suggestion may improve their review
should the court ever actually review a motion to suppress with ambiguous findings
of fact.

